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Abstract: This project focuses on the competitive pressure, or the threat of competitive pressure, 
generated by charter school policy. This paper uses longitudinal district-level data and multiple 
quasi-experimental designs to examine the relationship between two Ohio charter school policies 
and changes in public school district instructional resource allocation. Some believe that the 
competitive pressure created by charter schools will improve efficiency in district-run public schools; 
however, the findings from this study do not reliably demonstrate that charter school policy will 
induce a public school district to increase the level of instructional resource allocation. The findings 
do provide evidence that some charter policies are linked to changes in resource allocation at certain 
school districts. This study suggests that additional, multiple method investigations are needed to 
study how public school districts respond to competition and policies designed to change the levels 
of competition in the public school system.    
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Evaluando la acción política de las escuelas charter y la asignación de recursos en el Distrito 
Escolar de Ohio  
Resumen: Este proyecto se centra en las presiones competitivas, o la amenaza de presiones 
competitivas, generada por las políticas  de las escuelas charter. Este trabajo utiliza datos 
longitudinales a nivel de distrito y diseños múltiples cuasi-experimentales para examinar la relación 
entre las dos políticas y los cambios de las escuelas chárter de Ohio en la asignación de recursos de 
instrucción para el distrito escolar público. Algunos creen que las presiones competitivas, creada por 
las escuelas charter mejorarán la eficiencia en las escuelas públicas administradas por el distrito; Sin 
embargo, los resultados de este estudio no demuestran fehacientemente que las políticas de las 
escuelas chárter inducirán un distrito escolar público para aumentar el nivel de asignación de 
recursos de instrucción. Los hallazgos proporcionan evidencia de que algunas cambios en la 
asignación de recursos en ciertos distritos escolares están vinculados a las escuelas charter. Este 
estudio sugiere que se necesitan investigaciones adicionales, con métodos múltiples para estudiar 
cómo los distritos escolares públicos responden a la competencia y las políticas diseñadas para 
cambiar los niveles de competitividad en el sistema de educación pública. 
Palabras clave: políticas escuelas charter; asignación de recursos; diseños cuasi-experimentales 
 
Avaliando a ação política das escolas charter e a alocação de recursos no Distrito Escolar de 
Ohio 
Resumo: Este projeto centra-se em pressões de concorrência, ou a ameaça de pressões de 
concorrência, geradas por políticas das escolas charter . Este trabalho usa dados longitudinais a nível 
distrital e um modelo quase-experimental para examinar a relação entre as duas políticas e as 
mudanças nas escolas charter em a alocação de recursos de instrução para o distrito de escolas 
públicas em Ohio. Alguns acreditam que as pressões de concorrência criadas por escolas charter 
melhorariam a eficiência das escolas públicas operadas pelo distrito; No entanto, os resultados deste 
estudo não mostram conclusivamente que as políticas das escolas charter induziram os distritos 
escolares públicos para aumentar o nível de recursos alocados a instrução. No entanto  ha evidências 
de que algumas mudanças na alocação de recursos em determinados distritos escolares estão ligados 
a escolas charter. Este estudo sugere que é necessária mais investigação, com métodos mistos para 
estudar como distritos escolares públicos respondem à concorrência e políticas destinadas a alterar 
os níveis de concorrência no sistema de ensino público. 
Palavras-chave: escolas charter Políticos; alocação de recursos; modelos quase-experimentais 
 
Examining Charter School Policy and Public School District Resource 
Allocation in Ohio 
 
In the United States, educational reform policies have continued to blur the distinction 
between public and private schooling by introducing a variety of market-based educational reforms 
such as charter schools, private school vouchers, open-enrollment schemes, and tuition tax credits. 
Advocates of choice-based reforms claim that such policies, in addition to offering alternative 
options, will improve the performance and efficiency of district-run public schools by exposing 
them to competitive pressure (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Friedman, 1955). Competition from charter 
schools is expected to open additional educational options for students and families and, through 
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competitive effects, improve the efficiency of district-run public schools1. However, district leaders 
are sensitive to various inputs, and the threat of competition, inherent in charter school policies, may 
alone be sufficient to drive change in school district efficiency.    
Much of the research on charter schools has focused on comparing charter schools to 
district-run public schools. Research into the effects of charter schools on district-run public 
schools, has returned mixed results (Arsen & Ni, 2012; Bettinger, 2005; Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; 
Booker et al., 2008; Hoxby, 2003; Sass, 2006). While these studies speak to the effect of charter 
school competition, they do not directly measure the effect of the threat of competition inherent in 
charter school policies.  
Very little is known about the effects of charter school policy on district-run public schools, 
and understanding how existing publicly-run school districts may respond to these policies is 
important. Policies generating competition in public education, such as charter school policies, have 
been sold to the public as a rising “tide that lifts all boats” (Hoxby, 2003, p. 1), but evidence to 
support these claims are lacking, conflicted, or highly contextualized (Arsen & Ni, 2012; Bettinger, 
2005; Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Booker et al., 2008; Hoxby, 2003; Ni & Arsen, 2010; Sass, 2006). 
Additionally, these studies examine the effects of charter school competition, though do not directly 
examine the impact of charter school policy, which generates the threat of competition. Current 
research discussed below offers conflicting evidence on the impact of competition on public school 
district efficiency (Arsen & Ni, 2012; Chakrabarti & Roy, 2012). Seeing as Chakrabarti and Roy 
found that policies that decrease competition led to decreased efficiency, and Arsen and Ni found 
that increased competition led to decreased efficiency, there is clearly a need for greater 
understanding of the roles that competition and policy play in shaping public school district 
behavior and efficiency. This study proposes to examine aspects of the assertion that increasing 
competition for public school districts will lead to greater efficiency in said districts. However, this 
study, rather than looking at the direct effect of competition on efficiency, examines the potential 
for policy, policy designed to increase competition, to impact public school district resource 
allocation. 
Resource Allocation and Policies as a Proxy for Efficiency  
If we accept the contention, as made famous by Friedman (1955), that increasing 
competition in the educational marketplace leads to greater efficiency, then the expected changes in 
efficiency should generate from the central district office where most resource allocation decisions 
are made. However, there is a finite amount of resources available to public school districts, typically 
determined through a combination of local, state, and federal contributions. These resources can be 
divided into different expenditure types including personnel, instruction, activities, infrastructure, 
transportation, and food service (Thompson, Wood, & Crampton, 2008).  
The finite level of resources and the needs of the district constrain a district’s ability to 
become more efficient. In order to become more efficient, districts may focus on increasing 
achievement, and restrict themselves to spending money in areas that are most connected to student 
performance, namely instruction (Arsen & Ni, 2012). There is a growing literature that relies on the 
assertion that instructional expenditures are more productive, in terms of contribution to student 
achievement, than administrative expenditures. As such, an increase in the proportion of a budget 
directed towards instruction can be interpreted as an attempted increase in efficiency (Arsen & Ni, 
                                                 
1 While charter schools are publicly funded, I am drawing a distinction between charter schools and public 
school districts or publicly-run school districts. Public school districts, in this case, are typically referred to in 
the literature as “traditional public school districts.” 
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2012; Chakrabarti & Roy, 2012). Arsen and Ni (2012) examined the role of charter penetration — 
the market share of students that attend charter schools within a district — in public school district 
resource allocation. They found that though there were no immediate effects, public school districts 
exposed to high levels of competition for long periods of time shifted resources away from 
instruction and into administrative expenditures. These findings indicate that high levels of 
competition, resulted in decreased efficiency — a finding that contradicts economic theory 
(Friedman, 1955). Whereas, Chakrabarti and Roy (2012) found that Michigan’s Proposal A, a 1994 
policy that centralized Michigan educational spending, resulted in decreased instructional 
expenditures. As local budgetary control is viewed as a generator of Tiebout competition in which 
residents seek out their preferred tax-service package, Proposal A can be viewed as a policy that 
decreased competition in Michigan. While Arsen and Ni (2012) found that increased competition led 
to decreased instructional expenditures, Chakrabarti and Roy (2012) found that decreased 
competition also led to decreased instructional expenditures. This indicates that competition, as 
measured by the activation of Policy A or charter school penetration, resulted in conflicting findings 
when using instructional resource expenditures as a proxy for efficiency. However, the use of 
resource allocation as a proxy for school district efficiency and the use of state policy as a proxy for 
competition (Chakrabarti & Roy, 2012) establish a useful theoretical framework for the study of 
competition and efficiency through the use of charter school policy and public school district 
resource allocation. Incorporating these most recent studies into the economic theory of 
competition as a driving force for improved efficiency (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Friedman, 1955), a 
district responding to potential or actual charter school competition by attempting to become more 
efficient may shift resource allocation out of non-instructional expenditures and into instructional 
expenditures. Following this framework, this study tests whether charter policies impact resource 
allocation changes at public school districts, and answers the following research question: what are 
the size and direction of the changes in public school district instructional resource allocation 
associated with changes in state charter school policy?  
Research Context and Data Sources 
The expansion of charter schools throughout the country provides different opportunities to 
support research of charter schools as a market-based reform, but the educational and legislative 
context in Ohio is particularly well-suited for this research. Ohio is a hotbed for market-based 
reform, even having been referred to as the “Wild, Wild West” of charter schools (O’Donnell, 
2014). Ohio has instituted multiple market-based reforms including charter schools and vouchers2. 
In addition, charter school legislation has existed in Ohio for over 15 years. While this context is 
exciting for examining outcomes associated with charter school policies, this study only examines 
changes immediately following the initial charter school policies in Ohio, Senate Bill 55 and House 
Bill 282, rather than examining changes over time, as I rely on the exogenous shock of policy 
activation to examine the immediate changes in resource allocation associated with the policies. 
Research Context 
In 1997, Ohio passed Senate Bill 55 (SB55) which permitted conversion charter schools 
throughout the state, but only permitted start-ups in Lucas County and the ‘urban eight’3 city 
districts. In 1999, Ohio passed House Bill 282 (HB282), a similar bill that impacted an additional 13 
                                                 
2 Also known as the “EdChoice Scholarship Plan.” 
3 Akron, Canton, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Toledo, and Youngstown. 
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districts: Cleveland Heights, East Cleveland, Elyria, Euclid, Hamilton, Lima, Lorain, Mansfield, 
Middletown, Parma, South-Western, Springfield, and Warren (Legislation for Community Schools, n.d.).  
Following SB55, community schools could be established as start-ups or conversion schools. 
Start-up community schools are new schools sponsored by external authorizers, while conversion 
community schools are sponsored by the local public school district. As conversion charters, 
authorized by the local school district, generate less competitive pressure, I focus on charter school 
policies related to start-ups, authorized by an outside entity. Previous research indicates that public 
school districts are more threatened or motivated to respond to charter school competition when 
the charter school is sponsored by an external agency (Hess et al., 2001; Ni & Arsen, 2010). Since 
Ohio policy specifically allows for start-up charter schools under different circumstances than 
district sponsored charter schools, the inclusion of this distinction better informs this study of the 
nature of competitive responses in educational markets. For these reasons, I focus specifically on the 
8 districts in which non-district sponsored start-up community schools could be opened following 
SB55 and the 13 districts in which non-district sponsored start-up community schools could be 
opened following HB282. 
Data Sources 
The data for this analysis were collected from the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES) Common Core of Data. The financial data, including total expenditures, instructional 
expenditures, and support expenditures were organized by type, year, and district. The collected data 
ranges from 1995 to 2004. According to the NCES, instructional expenditures include teachers’ 
salaries and benefits, as well as instructional supplies and services4. In addition to financial data, data 
related to district student demographics, district organization, and district size were also collected 
(National Center for Education Statistics, n.d.). 
Analytic Samples, Plausibility of Inferences, and Models 
There are over 600 publicly-run school districts in Ohio, of which SB55 impacted 8 and 
HB282 impacted 13. Despite the low number of affected districts, since the policies targeted the 
largest districts in Ohio, a significant proportion of students were impacted by these policies. 
Though only a total of 21 districts were directly affected by these policies, SB55 impacted 316,327 
Ohio students (17.47% of Ohio students) in 1998, and HB282 impacted 118,983 Ohio students 
(6.67% of Ohio students) in 2000. In 2000, after the implementation of HB282, over 400,000 
students attended a district that had been targeted by either SB55 or HB282.  
Analytic Samples 
District characteristics, including finance characteristics, number of students, grades of 
students, student demographics, Free Lunch Eligibility (FLE), and student Individualized Education 
Plan (IEP) status, are listed in Table 1. Student race, FLE, IEP status, and grade level are all reported 
as a proportion of the total district population. Unfortunately, these data were not collected for 
every school district and therefore the full analytical sample only contains the 230 Ohio school 
districts from which reported data on these characteristics were collected. As NCES only collected 
                                                 
4 Current instruction expenditures include expenditures for activities related to the interaction between 
teachers and students, including salaries and benefits for teachers and teacher aides, textbooks, supplies, and 
purchased services. These expenditures also include expenditures relating to extracurricular and co-curricular 
activities. For further information, NCES provides definitions of all financial data terms in publication 
reports, such as http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014303.pdf. 
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complete data for 230 school districts in Ohio, the analyses are restricted to those districts. It is not 
clear that there are specific district characteristics that led to missing data in the NCES CCD, if 
districts are not randomly missing data (and therefore removed from the analyses) this could impede 
the generalizability of any findings from this study. Lucas County school districts which, according 
to the Ohio Department of Education, were impacted by charter school legislation earlier than other 
SB55 school districts are removed from the dataset. Lucas County was the subject of the community 
school pilot and was subject to the potential influences of community school competition prior to 
the implementation of SB55. Due to the nature of the analytic models, those districts participating in 
the pilot prior to SB55 must be removed from the analyses. Further, because treatment status (i.e. 
being targeted by charter school policy) is inherently associated with certain characteristics such as 
district size, an additional comparison group was created to test the robustness of the findings. The 
smaller dataset, referred to as the “restricted dataset,” only includes comparison districts that had 
 
Table 1.  
Mean District Characteristics by Treatment Status (1995-2004) 
 
 
SB55 Districts 
(n=8) 
HB282 Districts 
(n=13) 
Comparison 
Districts (n=209) 
Restricted 
Comparison 
(n=27) 
%Instruction 
57.44 
(4.00) 
58.06 
(3.19) 
60.48 
(3.05) 
60.33 
(3.28) 
%Support 
38.52 
(3.61) 
38.01 
(3.81) 
35.85 
(3.25) 
36.77 
(3.43) 
Total Expenditures  
(in millions) 
313.42 
(190.45) 
69.15 
(28.02) 
22.94 
(17.22) 
54.26 
(12.32) 
Instructional Expenditures  
(in millions) 
180.98 
(111.05) 
40.13 
(16.18) 
13.79 
(10.27) 
32.47 
(6.40) 
Property Tax Revenue 
(in millions) 
129.49 
(92.49) 
30.96 
(19.78) 
13.36 
(13.75) 
37.15 
(12.72) 
Total Students 
37402.99 
(21504.98) 
9178.30 
(3808.58) 
3333.68 
(2180.40) 
7636.00 
(551.12) 
%Primary 
48.56 
(2.87) 
47.11 
(2.89) 
43.97 
(2.90) 
42.61 
(2.96) 
%Middle 
22.44 
(1.19) 
22.84 
(1.11) 
23.23 
(1.30) 
22.63 
(1.40) 
%Secondary 
25.54 
(2.17) 
27.82 
(2.74) 
31.00 
(2.48) 
31.71 
(0.75) 
%IEP 
13.89 
(5.30) 
12.98 
(4.94) 
11.08 
(4.65) 
10.90 
(3.53) 
%Free-Lunch Eligible 
54.03 
(14.20) 
37.89 
(15.66) 
16.29 
(11.83) 
6.04 
(2.73) 
%Black 
57.15 
(12.93) 
35.15 
(26.70) 
6.49 
(13.66) 
2.53 
(1.44) 
%Latino 
3.23 
(3.08) 
3.21 
(7.00) 
1.32 
(2.44) 
1.06 
(0.27) 
%Asian 
0.92 
(0.73) 
0.69 
(0.59) 
1.18 
(1.50) 
2.49 
(2.03) 
%Native American 
0.16 
(0.12) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
0.14 
(0.06) 
%White 
36.50 
(13.59) 
58.98 
(26.44) 
89.92 
(14.67) 
92.71 
(3.62) 
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total expenditures or total enrollment greater than the smallest HB282 targeted district in 1995. This 
is in no way a matched sample, but offers some insight into the robustness of the findings. District 
characteristics, based on treatment status, are reported in Table 1. The restricted dataset does not 
offer more or less rigorous findings than the full dataset; however, looking across the analyses and 
datasets allows an examination of the robustness of the findings. 
There were obvious differences between SB55 districts, HB282 districts, and the comparison non-
targeted school districts, as seen in Table 1. These differences were implicit in the policies 
themselves, as SB55 targeted the eight largest school districts in Ohio and HB282 targeted the next 
13 populous districts. For example, SB55 districts had a much larger total student population and 
budget. HB282 districts also, though to a lesser extent, had larger student populations and budgets 
than the comparison districts. Other differences found between the policy targeted districts and 
comparison districts are typically associated with urban school districts such as higher proportions of 
minority students, FLE students, and IEP students. SB55 districts, and HB282 districts, allocated a 
larger proportion of their budgets to support expenditures. Support expenditures include 
maintenance and operations, transportation, school district administration, business expenses, and 
other administrative or support expenditures (Common Core of Data, “N.D.”). This was expected 
as larger urban districts typically have a larger, more expensive infrastructure; an additional possible 
explanation for this difference was the higher proportion of students receiving services associated 
with FLE or IEPs in the more densely populated districts. This is not problematic for measuring the 
impact of SB55 and HB282 as the models account for these differences; of greater concern are pre-
policy trends in instructional resource allocation. In fact, a key strength of the analytic models is that 
the comparison groups do not need to have similar background characteristics. As long as the pre-
treatment trends in the outcome variable are similar, the similarity of the treatment and comparison 
groups is not essential. This issue is discussed in greater detail in the following section.  
 
Plausibility of Inferences 
In this study, I examined two charter school policies passed in Ohio through the use of 
difference-in-difference (DID), regression discontinuity (RD), and difference-in-regression-
discontinuity (DRD) models, all considered quasi-experimental designs. Quasi-experimental designs 
allow researchers to make limited causal inferences provided certain assumptions are met (Murnane 
& Willett, 2011; Shadish & Cook, 2009); in addition, designs such as DID, RD, and DRD are 
appropriate for estimating the changes in instructional allocation associated with the introduction of 
charter school policies.  
In this case, the shift in charter school policies, which altered the eligibility of certain districts 
to compete with externally sponsored charter schools, provides an opportunity to examine the 
impact of these policies on the policy targeted districts through the use of DID and DRD designs. 
These analyses rely on the assumption that the comparison school districts’ differences are a 
reasonable proxy for the differences that would have been experienced by the targeted school 
districts, had the policy not existed. I address this assumption by examining the similarity in trends, 
not similarity in levels, between targeted and comparison districts prior to the implementation of the 
policy—these concerns are addressed in Figure 1, which charts the trends of proportion of budgets 
dedicated to instructional expenditures by treatment type. Figure 1 shows pre-policy trends in 
HB282 districts are nearly identical to pre-policy trends in comparison districts. On the other hand, 
pre-policy trends in the SB55 districts are not identical to comparison districts, and if these 
differences are due to omitted variable bias, it jeopardizes the models’ validity for making reliable 
inferences.  
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Figure 1: Percent of budget dedicated to instruction by treatment status
 
It is possible that the differences between SB55 districts and comparison districts are due to 
district characteristics such as district size or student demographics. If that is the case, by accounting 
for those characteristics in the model, I have addressed any concerns related to pre-policy trends. 
The largest concern is the drastic drop in instructional resource allocation the year before the 
activation of SB55 in districts targeted by the policy. Examining each district’s change from 1996 to 
1997, it seems most districts spent less in 1997 than in 1996. However, Cleveland spent 7.3% less in 
1997 and Youngstown spent 5.4% less, decreases much larger than the average 1.7% in other 
districts with a decrease in instructional resource allocation. It is possible that pre-policy trends at 
Cleveland and Youngstown bias estimates related to SB55. For this reason, estimates related to SB55 
may provide plausible estimates related to changes in resource allocation associated with charter 
school policies, however, estimates based on HB282 are more reliable.     
A further concern of the DID analysis is that it is only able to include observations from the 
year immediately before and immediately after the implementation of the treatment. I test the 
robustness the findings from the DID analyses, and address the weakness of limited time frames, by 
also conducting RD and DRD analyses. Through the RD model, I establish a relationship between a 
continuous measure of time and the proportion of the resources allocated towards a district. This 
produces estimates of the change in resource allocation associated with the policy, because the 
relationship is disrupted at the cut point, activation of the charter school policy. The RD analyses 
measure targeted districts’ instructional resource allocations over time, and estimate trends in 
resource allocation, which allows an examination of how those trends change at the cut-point. These 
changes in the trend represent the effect of the policy on resource allocation the year the policy 
occurred. However, the RD analyses only contain the school districts targeted by the policy, 
therefore, the model is unable to absorb state-wide secular trends in resource allocation, an 
advantage of the DID and DRD models.  
The DRD model incorporates the longer time frame used by the RD models while still 
accounting for the state-wide secular trends provided by the comparison group in the DID model. 
The DID estimates are based on the interaction of dichotomous indicators of whether the district 
was targeted by the policy and whether the policy was activated, but requires the time frame 
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
SB55 Districts
SB55 Comparison Districts
HB282 Districts
HB282 Comparison Districts
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included in the dataset to be limited to one year before and one year after the policy’s activation. The 
RD model estimates the effects of the policies based on the interaction of a dichotomous indicator 
of whether the observation occurred after policy implementation and a continuous indicator of time, 
but only policy targeted districts are included in the analyses. Using the DRD model, I estimate the 
changes in instructional resource allocation associated with the policies based on the interaction of 
dichotomous indicators of whether the district was targeted by the policy and whether the policy 
was implemented; however, because the dataset contains multiple years of data, the model also 
includes a continuous indicator for year. Through the use of several interaction terms and the year 
term, I estimate the changes in resource allocation in targeted districts associated with the activation 
of the policy immediately following the activation of the policy. The DRD exploits the strengths of 
the DID and the RD by comparing districts targeted by the policy after policy activation to districts 
targeted by the policy before policy activation while accounting for trends in districts not targeted by 
the policy, and including observations for multiple years before and after policy activation.  
Models 
The datasets contain annual observations nested within districts. In order to account for the 
within district variation of instructional expenditures over multiple years, I utilize hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM) to cluster annual observations for each district, and compare the post-policy 
instructional expenditures to pre-policy instructional expenditures. HLM is appropriate for such 
analyses of longitudinal data (Snijders & Bosker, 1999).  
According to Arsen and Ni (2012), there are several factors identified in the literature 
associated with school district resource allocation. I include the same factors as Arsen and Ni in 
these analyses: total district enrollment in logarithmic form, total district expenditures in logarithmic 
form, property tax revenue per student in logarithmic form, and the percentage of district FLE 
students5. Arsen and Ni also included measurements of student characteristics such as the 
percentage of students that receive special education services and indicators of racial characteristics, 
such measures are also included in these analyses.  
The models are constructed beginning with policy related covariates, which differ based on 
model construction. Next, covariates related to district size are added, such as total number of 
students. Next, covariates related to district organization are added, which include the proportion of 
the district students in primary grades (kindergarten through fifth grade), middle grades (sixth 
through eighth grade), and secondary grades (ninth through twelfth grade). Next, covariates related 
to the characteristics of the student body are added, which include the proportion of the students 
that are identified as African-American, Latino, Asian-American, Native-American, and Caucasian, 
as well as FLE students or students eligible for IEP services. Finally, covariates related to district 
finances are added such as district expenditures and revenues. The dependent variable, instructional 
resource allocation, is calculated as the proportion of the total school district budget dedicated to 
instructional expenditures in a given school district (𝑗) for a given year (𝑖): 𝑌𝑖𝑗 =
 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗⁄ . I use the DID, RD, and DRD models to examine if SB55 and HB282 are 
associated with changes in instructional resource allocation in targeted school districts.  
In the DID models, the variables for each year are nested within a district, comprising the 
level one observations (𝑛𝑖𝑆𝐵55 = 460, 𝑛𝑖𝐻𝐵282 = 444 ). Thus, the school districts are the clustered 
                                                 
5 Arsen and Ni (2012) include the percentage of students eligible for free and reduced lunch, but due to data 
constraints only measurements for free lunch are available and included in these analyses. 
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variable and comprise the level two observations (𝑛𝑗𝑆𝐵55 = 230, 𝑛𝑗𝐻𝐵282 = 222)
6. Level one 
covariates, observations pertaining to a single year, are included, however, the only level two 
covariate included is district treatment status, a dichotomous indicator of whether or not the district 
was targeted by charter school policy. In this manner, the HLM serves to cluster the standard errors 
of the school districts over time in the analyses. Level two covariates, such as district level means, 
and district centered measurements were examined, but not found to improve model fit.  
According to Meyer (1995), traditional DID designs are sensitive to variations in the 
functional form, meaning small changes in a single equation component may lead to skewed 
reporting of treatment effects. The use of HLM allows additional covariates and other tests of 
model fit. The independent variables in the DID models include a dichotomous indicator of 
whether the district was targeted by a policy (𝑆𝐵55𝑗 , 𝐻𝐵282𝑗), a dichotomous indicator of whether 
the observation occurred before or after the activation of the policy (𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦1𝑖, 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦2𝑖), and an 
interaction term indicating whether the district was targeted by the policy and the policy was 
activated [(𝑆𝐵55𝑗 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦1𝑖), (𝐻𝐵282𝑗 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦2𝑖)]. By estimating the change in instructional 
resource allocation for districts targeted by the policy when the policy was activated, these models 
estimate the degree to which charter school policies are associated with changes in resource 
allocation in policy targeted districts. The models are displayed in equation 1 and equation 2.  
 
Equation 1. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛾01𝑆𝐵55𝑗 + 𝛾10𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦1𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾20(𝑆𝐵55𝑗 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦1𝑖𝑗) + 𝛾3𝑗𝑿𝑖𝑗 +  𝑈0𝑗 +  𝑅𝑖𝑗  
 
Equation 2. 
 𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛾01𝐻𝐵282𝑗 + 𝛾10𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾20(𝐻𝐵282𝑗 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦2𝑖𝑗) + 𝛾3𝑗𝑿𝑖𝑗 + 𝑈0𝑗 +  𝑅𝑖𝑗 
 
Wherein 𝑌𝑖𝑗 measures the proportion of a school district’s budget dedicated to instructional 
expenditures, 𝑿𝑖𝑗 is a matrix of district covariates, 𝑈0𝑗 measures the level two residual, and 𝑅𝑖𝑗 
measures the level one residual. The interaction variable,(𝑆𝐵55𝑗 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦1𝑖𝑗) or(𝐻𝐵282𝑗 ∗
𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦2𝑖𝑗), reports the size and significance of the changes in instructional resource allocation 
associated with the charter school policies. In order to examine these changes, these models only 
include the years immediately before and after the policies were activated7.  
The RD models include multiple years of observations before and policy activation. This 
accounts for pre- and post-policy trends in the targeted school districts; however, the RD datasets 
analyses only include policy targeted districts. In order to estimate changes in resource allocation 
associated with the charter school policies, I place the cut point along the X axis at the time of policy 
activation. By only including districts targeted by the policy, fewer level one observations are nested 
within the district (𝑛𝑖𝑆𝐵55= 48, 𝑛𝑖𝐻𝐵282= 130). Without the inclusion of comparison school 
districts, the level two observations are also fewer in number (𝑛𝑗𝑆𝐵55= 8, 𝑛𝑗𝐻𝐵282= 13). I estimate 
changes in the proportion of district budget allocated for instruction based on an interaction of a 
continuous measure of time and a dichotomous indicator of time of policy activation [(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 ∗
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟97𝑖𝑗), (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟99𝑖𝑗)]. Since only districts targeted by the policy are included in the 
                                                 
6 Here I have reported 𝑛𝑖 and 𝑛𝑗 for the larger dataset, the restricted dataset contains fewer observations. The 
number of observations in the restricted dataset for each model is reported in Table 2 and Table 3.  
7 The model examining SB55 includes 1997 and 1998, and the model examining HB282 includes 1999 and 
2000, thereby including the year immediately before and the year immediately after policy activation. 
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analysis, there is no need for an indicator of whether the district was targeted by the policy. 
However, a dichotomous indicator of whether the observation occurred after policy activation 
(𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟97𝑖𝑗 , 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟99𝑖𝑗) and a continuous indicator for year (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗) are included. By estimating the 
change in instructional resource allocation for districts targeted by the policy when the policy was 
activated, but still accounting for trends occurring in the surrounding years, I attempt to measure the 
change in resource allocation at public school districts associated with charter school policies. These 
models are reflected in equation 3 and equation 4. 
 
Equation 3. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛾10𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟97𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾20𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾30(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟97𝑖𝑗) + 𝛾4𝑗𝑿𝑖𝑗 +  𝑈0𝑗 +  𝑅𝑖𝑗  
 
Equation 4. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛾10𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟99𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾20𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾30(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟99𝑖𝑗) + 𝛾4𝑗𝑿𝑖𝑗 +  𝑈0𝑗 +  𝑅𝑖𝑗 
 
Wherein 𝑌𝑖𝑗 measures the proportion of a school district’s budget dedicated to instructional 
expenditures, 𝑿𝑖𝑗 is a matrix of district covariates, 𝑈0𝑗 measures the level two residual, and 𝑅𝑖𝑗 
measures the level one residual. The interaction term [(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟97𝑖𝑗),(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟99𝑖𝑗)] 
allows me to report the size and significance of changes in resource allocation associated with the 
charter school policies. An equal number of years before and after the implementation of the 
policies are included in both analyses8. 
The DRD models include multiple years before and after implementation, as well as a 
comparison group of non-targeted districts, but statistically isolate only the changes associated with 
the policies on the policy-targeted districts immediately following the activation of the policies. I 
estimate changes in resource allocation associated with the charter school policies at the time the 
policy was activated, while still accounting for any secular trends in instructional resource allocation. 
This is done by accounting for trends in time related measures and policy targeted districts, as well as 
interactions of these measures, and by placing the cut point along the X axis at the time of policy 
activation. In the DRD models, a comparison group is included as well as multiple years of analysis 
leading to a larger number of level one observations (𝑛𝑖𝑆𝐵55 = 1380, 𝑛𝑖𝐻𝐵282 = 2220)9, and the 
same number of level two observations, as seen in the DID models (𝑛𝑗𝑆𝐵55 = 230, 𝑛𝑗𝐻𝐵282 =
222). Estimating the changes in the proportion of district budgets allocated to instruction associated 
with the activation of the policy is measured as a dichotomous indicator of whether the district was 
targeted by the policy and whether the observation occurred after the policy activated [(𝑆𝐵55𝑗 ∗
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟97𝑖𝑗), (𝐻𝐵282𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟99𝑖𝑗)]. These estimates are only reliable after accounting for 
additional measures, including: a dichotomous indicator of whether the district was targeted by a 
policy (𝑆𝐵55𝑗 , 𝐻𝐵282𝑗), a dichotomous indicator of whether the observation occurred after policy 
activation (𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟97𝑖𝑗 , 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟99𝑖𝑗), a continuous indicator for year (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗), an indicator for year 
and whether the observation occurred after policy activation [(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟97𝑖𝑗), (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 ∗
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟99𝑖𝑗)], an indicator for year and whether the district was targeted by the policy [(𝑆𝐵55𝑗 ∗
                                                 
8 The RD and DRD models examining SB55 include 1995 through 2000, three years before and after policy 
activation because the earliest available data is 1995. The RD and DRD models examining HB282 include 
1995 through 2004, including five years before and five years after policy activation. 
9 As in the RD model, the SB55 analysis includes 6 years of observations and the HB282 analysis includes 10 
years of data. For this reason, despite there being more level two observations in the SB55 analysis, there are 
more level one observations in the HB282 analysis. 
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𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗), (𝐻𝐵282𝑗 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗)], and an indicator for year, whether the district was targeted by the 
policy, and whether the observation occurred after policy activation [(𝑆𝐵55𝑗 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 ∗
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟97𝑖𝑗), (𝐻𝐵282𝑗 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟99𝑖𝑗)]. These models are reflected in equation 5 and 
equation 6. 
 
Equation 5. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛾01𝑆𝐵55𝑗 + 𝛾10𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟97𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾20𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾3𝑗(𝑆𝐵55𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟97𝑖𝑗) + 𝛾4𝑗(𝑆𝐵55𝑗 ∗
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗) + 𝛾50(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟97𝑖𝑗) + 𝛾6𝑗(𝑆𝐵55𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟97𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗) + 𝛾7𝑗𝑿𝑖𝑗 +  𝑈0𝑗 +  𝑅𝑖𝑗  
 
Equation 6. 
 𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛾01𝐻𝐵28255𝑗 + 𝛾10𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟99𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾20𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾3𝑗(𝐻𝐵282𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟99𝑖𝑗) +
𝛾4𝑗(𝐻𝐵282𝑗 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗) + 𝛾50(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟99𝑖𝑗) + 𝛾6𝑗(𝐻𝐵282𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟99𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗) +
𝛾7𝑗𝑿𝑖𝑗 +  𝑈0𝑗 +  𝑅𝑖𝑗 
 
Wherein 𝑌𝑖𝑗 measures the proportion of a school district’s budget dedicated to instructional 
expenditures, 𝑿𝑖𝑗 is a matrix of district covariates, 𝑈0𝑗 measures the level two residual, and 𝑅𝑖𝑗 
measures the level one residual. The interaction variable [(𝑆𝐵55𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟97𝑖𝑗),(𝐻𝐵282𝑗 ∗
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟99𝑖𝑗)] measures the change in district instructional resource allocation associated with the 
policy. The DRD models, like the RD models, include an equal number of years before and after the 
activation of the policies. 
Results 
In order to examine the impact of SB55 and HB282 on public school district resource 
allocation from multiple analytic angles, three methods were used to examine each policy. Tables 2 
and 3 report the findings from these analyses. Additional tables containing parameter estimates for 
the entire models are located in Appendix A. For each policy a nested DID and DRD analysis is 
reported examining the change in instructional resource allocation associated with the charter school 
policy using both datasets. The RD analyses, unlike the DID and DRD analyses, are already 
restricted to only policy-targeted districts and therefore, only one dataset is used to examine the 
outcomes associated with these analyses; as such, RD results are not reported for the restricted 
sample. The restricted sample comparison group more closely resembles SB55 and HB282 districts 
than the larger comparison group in terms of total expenditures, property tax revenue, and total 
students—three measures important to resource allocation (Arsen & Ni, 2012). 
 
SB55 Outcomes 
 
As seen in Table 2, I found in the DID analyses that the change in instructional resource 
allocation associated with SB55 in the districts targeted by SB55 ranged from 0.99% to 1.30%, 
depending on the sample and model characteristics. Additionally, the standard errors of this estimate 
remained stable and slightly diminished with the introduction of additional covariates in models two, 
three, four, and five. The estimates of the changes associated with the policy were similar between 
both samples, despite the diminished degrees of freedom in the restricted dataset. The estimates are 
significant across all models and both datasets (p<0.05). As seen in model five of both datasets, the 
activation of SB55 resulted in an increase in the proportion of the budget dedicated to instructional 
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expenditures between 0.99% and 1.30% after accounting for district and student characteristics. 
Districts targeted by SB55 spent between 0.99% and 1.30% more on instruction than they would 
have, had such a policy not existed.  
 
Table 2  
SB55 Outcomes 
 
 
Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
Full sample  
DID (𝑛𝑗 = 230)  
RD (𝑛𝑗 = 8) 
DRD (𝑛𝑗 = 230) 
     
DID (𝑛𝑖 = 460) 
1.02* 
(0.51) 
1.02* 
(0.51) 
1.03* 
(0.51) 
1.01* 
(0.51) 
0.99* 
(0.50) 
RD (𝒏𝒊 = 𝟒𝟖) 
1.01~ 
(0.56) 
1.04~ 
(0.57) 
1.00 
(0.62) 
0.04 
(0.87) 
0.11 
(0.93) 
DRD (𝑛𝑖 = 1380) 
2.29** 
(0.86) 
2.29** 
(0.85) 
2.32** 
(0.86) 
2.46** 
(0.86) 
2.39** 
(0.83) 
Restricted sample 
DID(𝑛𝑗 = 48) 
DRD(𝑛𝑗 = 48) 
     
DID (𝑛𝑖 = 96) 
1.14* 
(0.56) 
1.13* 
(0.56) 
1.18* 
(0.58) 
1.27* 
(0.56) 
1.30* 
(0.51) 
DRD (𝑛𝑖 = 288) 
2.18* 
(0.93) 
2.16* 
(0.93) 
2.54** 
(0.94) 
2.80** 
(0.96) 
2.85** 
(0.93) 
~, p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
  
I found in the RD models of SB55 that the estimates were not statistically significant. Due to 
the low number of level one and level two observations, I was unable to determine if the 
undetectable change in instructional resource allocation was due to restricted degrees of freedom or 
the more developed model specificity. An assumption of RD designs is that observations at or near 
the cut point are randomly distributed on either side of the cut point, and therefore, the addition of 
covariates should not affect the variables of interest (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). However, considering 
that I examined the same districts over time, this assumption required a shorter leap, as I assumed 
that a given district is not inherently different in 1997 than it was in 1998, a less daunting assumption 
than assuming two different subjects with similar scores are inherently similar. The addition of the 
district covariates ensured that if a district changed in a significant way between the two years that 
were measured by the covariate, it was included in the analysis and part of the model. It is unclear if 
the drastic changes in parameter estimates seen between model 3 and model 4 reflect a violation of 
Lee and Lemieux’s assumption, or if those changes were simply due to the constrained number of 
degrees of freedom. Examining the changes associated with SB55 through a third quasi-
experimental lens, provided additional considerations.  
I found that the DRD analyses of SB55 supported the findings of the DID analyses. In fact, 
the results found in the DRD analyses suggest that the changes associated with the policy were 
much larger in magnitude than those found in the DID analyses. I found in the DRD analyses that 
the changes in instructional resource allocation associated with SB55 were significant across all 
models and both datasets. As seen in the DID analyses, the estimates from the restricted dataset 
were slightly larger than those found in the full dataset. The estimates are robust to changes in 
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sample and model specification. Districts targeted by SB55 spent between 2.39% and 2.85% more 
on instruction than they would have, had such a policy not existed. Such increases in instruction 
were equivalent to between $6,785,078.55 and $8,090,993.25. Also, effect size ranged from 0.87 for 
the full sample to 0.84 for the restricted sample. The significance of these estimates persisted across 
DRD models (p<0.01). Even though SB55 districts tended to allocate less towards instruction than 
comparison districts, the estimates from the DID and DRD suggest that these districts allocated 
more towards instruction than would have been allocated in the absence of this policy.  
These estimates do not suggest that more money was spent as a result of these policies, only 
that more of the available resources were allocated towards instruction. Additionally, a concern 
about the reliability of the analysis of SB55 is the difference between pre-policy trends of policy-
targeted districts and the comparison group, as seen in Figure 1. As discussed above, Cleveland and 
Youngstown school districts were largely responsible for the large, pre-policy drop in average 
instructional resource allocation for SB55 districts. The significance of the finding is not robust to 
removing either Cleveland (p=0.20) or Youngstown (p=0.16) in the DID model. In the DRD 
model, the main finding is robust to removing Cleveland (p=0.01), however the main finding is only 
marginally significant if Youngstown is removed (p=0.06). Also, if both Cleveland and Youngstown 
are removed, the main finding becomes insignificant (p=0.15). Despite the consistency of the DID 
analyses and the significance of the DRD analyses, since the pre-policy trends in the treatment group 
do not match those of the comparison groups for the SB55 analyses, HB282 provides more reliable 
analyses for measuring the impact these policies on public school district resource allocation. 
HB282 Outcomes  
As seen in Table 3, changes in instructional resource allocation associated with being a 
district targeted by HB282 in the year HB282 was activated were not statistically significant in any 
model or dataset. The standard errors of the treatment effect remained stable despite the 
introduction of additional variables in models two, three, four, and five. There is no conclusive 
evidence supporting the findings from the analyses of SB55.  
Unlike the findings in the analyses of SB55, the analyses of HB282 do not offer compelling 
evidence of a relationship between charter school policies and changes in instructional resource 
allocation. The lack of significance in the findings may suggest that there is something particular 
about SB55, or unobserved variable bias in the model, that resulted in the significant findings which 
are not generalizable to other policies or analyses. Considering the difference between pre-policy 
trends in SB55 districts and the comparison districts, the analyses of HB282 provide more reliable 
and generalizable estimates of how changes in charter school policy were associated with changes in 
instructional resource allocation. The most reliable estimates suggest that the threat of charter school 
policies were not associated with a significant change public school district resource allocation; 
however the findings from the SB55 suggest the need for further investigation.  
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Table 3.  
HB282 Outcomes 
 
 
Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
Full sample  
DID (𝑛𝑗 = 222) 
RD (𝑛𝑗 = 13) 
DRD (𝑛𝑗 = 222) 
     
DID (𝑛𝑖 = 444) 
0.30 
(0.38) 
0.30 
(0.38) 
0.30 
(0.38) 
0.31 
(0.38) 
0.42 
(0.38) 
RD (𝒏𝒊 = 𝟏𝟑𝟎) 
-0.07 
(0.17) 
-0.06 
(0.17) 
-0.16 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.30) 
-0.04 
(0.28) 
DRD (𝑛𝑖 = 2220) 
0.69 
(0.56) 
0.69 
(0.56) 
0.69 
(0.56) 
0.66 
(0.56) 
0.78 
(0.55) 
Restricted sample 
DID(𝑛𝑗 = 40) 
DRD(𝑛𝑗 = 40) 
     
DID (𝑛𝑖 = 80) 
0.17 
(0.52) 
0.20 
(0.52) 
0.20 
(0.54) 
0.20 
(0.54) 
0.40 
(0.43) 
DRD (𝑛𝑖 = 400) 
0.53 
(0.60) 
0.54 
(0.60) 
0.40 
(0.60) 
0.27 
(0.60) 
0.39 
(0.60) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
Significance 
Amidst shrinking budgets, increased accountability, and a national push to improve the 
efficiency of district-run public schools, over the last 20 years there has also been an influx of 
charter school policies (Lubienski & Weitzel, 2010). According to economic theory, such 
competition-based reforms should improve the effectiveness and efficiency of district-run schools 
(Chubb & Moe, 1990; Friedman, 1955; Hoxby, 2000). However, what we know about the effects of 
charter school competition on district-run public school efficiency is extremely limited. We do not 
know if charter school competition consistently has a statistically measurable, causal effect on 
district-run public school efficiency and leadership behavior, and have little statistical evidence 
outside of certain, specific contexts. Recently, the literature has supported the use of instructional 
resource allocation as a proxy for measuring the efficiency of a district (Arsen & Ni, 2012; 
Chakrabarti & Roy, 2012), and the use of policies designed to increase, or decrease, competition as a 
proxy for measuring competition (Chakrabarti & Roy, 2012).  
With no regard for violated methodological assumptions, and full acceptance that a policy 
threat of competition is an accurate proxy for competition and that instructional resource allocation 
is an accurate proxy for efficiency, the findings from this study still could not be taken as acceptable 
evidence supporting Friedman’s (1955) assertion that increased competition results in increased 
efficiency. These results provide possible, but not reliable evidence of a relationship between certain 
charter school policies and resource allocation in some public school districts. This study builds on a 
growing literature, and tests the hypothesis that competition improves efficiency by examining the 
impact of policies designed to increase competition on public school district resource allocation. 
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Though policies and resource allocation serve as proxies for competition and efficiency, it is not 
clear that such proxies are equivalent to such measures, or need they be. While this investigation can 
provide some insight to competition and efficiency, it explicitly measures the impact, or lack thereof, 
of charter policy on public school district behavior, an important investigation on its own merits.  
These analyses provide important guidance for future research. First, I found that SB55 led 
to increased proportions of school district budgets being allocated towards instruction; however, the 
reliability of these findings is confounded by differences in pre-policy trends. Second, I found in my 
analysis of HB282 no significant changes in instructional resource allocation associated with the 
activation of the policy. While the analysis of HB282 provides more reliable insight into the impact 
of charter policy on school district resource allocation, the difference in outcomes seen between the 
two sets of analyses, certainly lead to additional questions such as: if the findings from the SB55 
analyses are reliable, what are the elements of the policy, or the targeted districts, that led to a change 
in behavior for those 8 districts but not the 13 districts targeted by HB282? 
While I do not provide evidence suggesting that charter school policies lead to higher levels 
of instructional resource allocation, it is plausible to infer that SB55 was at least associated with 
higher instructional allocation in the SB55 districts; however, this quantitative analysis only goes so 
far and does not speak to how the specifics of school district behavior did or did not change in the 
face of charter school policy. Qualitative analyses can provide insight into whether the aggregate 
changes resource allocation were in relation to reducing administrative expenditures, restructuring 
instructional expenditures, or a purposeful reallocation based on charter policy. This study 
demonstrates the need for continued investigation using multiple methods to better understand 
changes in public school districts in response to changes in policy or measured levels of 
competition, and what those changes might look like.   
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Appendix  
Table A1.  
The DID Effects of SB55 on Instructional Resource Allocation 
 
𝑛𝑗 = 230, 𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 460 
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 57.50*** 
(1.07) 
61.07*** 
(3.33) 
60.46*** 
(4.65) 
56.83*** 
(4.80) 
11.39 
(10.94) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 1.02* 
(0.51) 
1.02* 
(0.51) 
1.03* 
(0.51) 
1.01* 
(0.51) 
0.99* 
(0.50) 
SB55 
 -4.35*** 
(1.09) 
-3.53** 
(1.31) 
-3.31* 
(1.34) 
-1.88 
(1.35) 
-1.32 
(1.28) 
After Policy 
 -0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.10) 
-0.05 
(0.11) 
0.35** 
(0.12) 
Total Studentsa 
 
 
-0.34 
(0.30) 
-0.29 
(0.31) 
0.25 
(0.32) 
8.31*** 
(1.40) 
%Primary 
 
  
-0.50 
(5.08) 
13.19~ 
(7.46) 
7.49 
(7.26) 
%Middle 
 
  
-5.82 
(8.23) 
3.40 
(10.01) 
1.67 
(9.65) 
%Secondary 
 
  
6.52 
(5.87) 
13.78~ 
(8.25) 
11.86 
(7.97) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
7.59 
(6.26) 
12.95* 
(6.05) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
-0.31 
(1.97) 
-1.43 
(2.15) 
%Black 
 
   
-16.48** 
(6.23) 
-9.76 
(6.11) 
%Latino 
 
   
3.46 
(8.92) 
7.01 
(8.52) 
%Asian 
 
   
-33.62* 
(16.55) 
13.62 
(17.51) 
%Native 
 
   
-147.15 
(117.71) 
-116.73 
(112.69) 
%White 
 
   
-9.83 
(6.15) 
-6.55 
(5.98) 
Total Expendituresb 
 
    
-8.16*** 
(1.42) 
Property Tax PPRc 
 
    
0.50 
(0.54) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
1.02*** 
(0.10) 
1.00*** 
(0.09) 
1.00*** 
(0.09) 
1.00*** 
(0.09) 
0.98*** 
(0.09) 
0.93*** 
(0.09) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
8.65*** 
(0.86) 
8.17*** 
(0.81) 
8.13*** 
(0.81) 
8.13*** 
(0.81) 
6.81*** 
(0.69) 
6.00*** 
(0.61) 
a. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠) 
b. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠) 
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
  
Examining charter school policy and public school district resource a llocation in Ohio 19 
    
 
 
Table A2.  
The RD Effects of SB55 on Instructional Resource Allocation 
 
𝑛𝑗 = 8, 𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 48 
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 
 57.27*** 
(1.33) 
47.75* 
(19.70) 
34.53 
(22.83) 
20.30 
(38.93) 
26.00 
(67.84) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 1.01~ 
(0.56) 
1.04~ 
(0.57) 
1.00 
(0.62) 
0.04 
(0.87) 
0.11 
(0.93) 
Year 
 -1.29** 
(0.40) 
-1.29** 
(0.40) 
-1.30** 
(0.39) 
-0.28 
(0.77) 
-0.29 
(0.81) 
After Policy 
 1.68 
(1.00) 
1.67 
(1.01) 
2.36* 
(1.05) 
1.88 
(1.11) 
1.98~ 
(1.15) 
Total Studentsa 
 
 
0.91 
(1.89) 
0.53 
(2.05) 
2.12 
(3.49) 
3.88 
(7.02) 
%Primary 
 
  
20.83 
(17.07) 
71.71~ 
(35.92) 
74.06~ 
(37.11) 
%Middle 
 
  
0.59 
(53.52) 
71.51 
(65.43) 
66.90 
(66.46) 
%Secondary 
 
  
28.62 
(35.30) 
83.47 
(57.75) 
86.12 
(58.09) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
-18.27 
(11.57) 
-18.89 
(11.79) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
0.89 
(1.76) 
0.67 
(1.84) 
%Black 
 
   
-52.50 
(36.19) 
-52.84 
(36.27) 
%Latino 
 
   
-102.76 
(78.04) 
-96.58 
(80.56) 
%Asian 
 
   
-208.69 
(281.54) 
-218.04 
(280.97) 
%Native 
 
   
-1349.46 
(877.58) 
-1326.69 
(881.11) 
%White 
 
   
-45.61 
(37.17) 
-46.07 
(37.20) 
Total Expendituresb 
 
    
-1.40 
(6.12) 
Property Tax PPRc 
 
    
1.10 
(3.42) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
3.65*** 
(0.82) 
2.54*** 
(0.57) 
2.55*** 
(0.57) 
2.36*** 
(0.53) 
1.94*** 
(0.46) 
1.94*** 
(0.47) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
11.94* 
(6.28) 
12.12* 
(6.27) 
11.51* 
(6.00) 
12.10* 
(6.35) 
16.25 
(10.78) 
15.93 
(11.28) 
a. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠) 
b. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠) 
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table A3.  
The DRD Effects of SB55 on Instructional Resource Allocation 
 
𝑛𝑗 = 230, 𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 1380 
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 57.27*** 
(1.04) 
62.16*** 
(3.04) 
60.73*** 
(3.67) 
58.12*** 
(3.79) 
122.92*** 
(7.41) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 2.29** 
(0.86) 
2.29** 
(0.85) 
2.32** 
(0.86) 
2.46** 
(0.86) 
2.39** 
(0.83) 
SB55 
 -5.93*** 
(1.21) 
-4.81*** 
(1.38) 
-4.71*** 
(1.39) 
-3.98** 
(1.41) 
-3.43* 
(1.35) 
Year 
 0.37*** 
(0.06) 
0.38*** 
(0.06) 
0.36*** 
(0.06) 
0.68*** 
(0.10) 
0.75*** 
(0.10) 
After Policy 
 -0.61*** 
(0.16) 
-0.61*** 
(0.16) 
-0.57*** 
(0.16) 
-0.75*** 
(0.17) 
-0.39* 
(0.17) 
SB55*Year 
 -1.66*** 
(0.34) 
-1.66*** 
(0.34) 
-1.65***  
(0.34) 
-1.72*** 
(0.35) 
-1.79*** 
(0.34) 
After Policy*Year 
 -0.70*** 
(0.09) 
-0.70*** 
(0.09) 
-0.69*** 
(0.09) 
-0.96*** 
(0.11) 
-0.55*** 
(0.12) 
SB55*Year*After 
 1.71 
(0.48) 
1.70*** 
(0.48) 
1.72*** 
(0.48) 
1.82*** 
(0.49) 
1.98*** 
(0.47) 
Total Studentsa 
 
 
-0.47~ 
(0.27) 
-0.45 
(0.28) 
-0.01 
(0.28) 
8.01*** 
(0.86) 
%Primary 
 
  
2,17 
(3.14) 
0.44 
(4.93) 
1.10 
(4.76) 
%Middle 
 
  
-6.51 
(4.41) 
-9.22 
(5.84) 
-6.09 
(5.65) 
%Secondary 
 
  
6.22~ 
(3.45) 
2.22 
(5.19) 
3.41 
(5.01) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
-7.71*** 
(1.91) 
-4.63* 
(1.87) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
1.43~ 
(0.83) 
0.83 
(0.82) 
%Black 
 
   
-1.43 
(4.49) 
0.68 
(4.34) 
%Latino 
 
   
14.16~ 
(7.17) 
13.18~ 
(6.90) 
%Asian 
 
   
-19.63 
(12.23) 
3.75 
(12.45) 
%Native 
 
   
-21.57 
(58.52) 
-12.23 
(56.53) 
%White 
 
   
3.91 
(4.40) 
3.05 
(4.25) 
Total Expendituresb 
 
    
-8.15*** 
(0.84) 
Property Tax PPRc 
 
    
0.78* 
(0.35) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
1.93*** 
(0.08) 
1.78*** 
(0.07) 
1.78*** 
(0.07) 
1.77*** 
(0.07) 
1.75*** 
(0.07) 
1.63*** 
(0.07) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
7.48*** 
(0.73) 
7.18*** 
(0.70) 
7.14*** 
(0.69) 
7.12*** 
(0.07) 
6.21*** 
(0.61) 
5.65*** 
(0.56) 
a. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠) 
b. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠) 
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue), *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table A4.  
The DID Effects of SB55 on Instructional Resource Allocation (Comparison) 
 
𝑛𝑗 = 48, 𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 96 
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 57.50*** 
(1.31) 
36.58* 
(14.08) 
27.87~ 
(15.35) 
42.85** 
(13.29) 
158.32*** 
(31.07) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 1.14* 
(0.56) 
1.13* 
(0.56) 
1.18* 
(0.58) 
1.27* 
(0.56) 
1.30* 
(0.51) 
SB55 
 -3.42* 
(1.43) 
-6.32* 
(2.40) 
-5.36* 
(2.44) 
-1.30 
(2.22) 
-0.13 
(2.11) 
After Policy 
 -0.25 
(0.23) 
-0.25 
(0.23) 
-0.26 
(0.24) 
-0.17 
(0.24) 
0.36 
(0.26) 
Total Studentsa 
 
 
2.01 
(1.35) 
2.17 
(1.38) 
0.83 
(1.15) 
13.37*** 
(3.30) 
%Primary 
 
  
-6.18 
(12.61) 
16.24 
(15.17) 
6.58 
(14.14) 
%Middle 
 
  
36.32 
(26.79) 
32.35 
(28.51) 
19.12 
(26.28) 
%Secondary 
 
  
9.46 
(14.00) 
6.54 
(16.20) 
7.08 
(15.14) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
11.55 
(16.91) 
12.58 
(15.75) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
1.34 
(4.52) 
-1.19 
(4.78) 
%Black 
 
   
-18.86* 
(8.44) 
-9.06 
(8.12) 
%Latino 
 
   
12.50 
(14.94) 
23.86 
(14.14) 
%Asian 
 
   
-8.72 
(29.35) 
21.70 
(29.99) 
%Native 
 
   
125.05 
(293.16) 
74.15 
(275.81) 
%White 
 
   
-7.48 
(8.29) 
-3.53 
(7.64) 
Total Expendituresb 
 
    
-13.62*** 
(3.47) 
Property Tax PPRc 
 
    
2.07 
(1.50) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
1.14*** 
(0.23) 
1.05*** 
(0.21) 
1.05*** 
(0.21) 
1.01*** 
(0.21) 
0.91*** 
(0.19) 
0.75*** 
(0.16) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
13.70*** 
(2.91) 
12.62*** 
(2.68) 
12.03*** 
(2.57) 
11.70*** 
(2.50) 
6.97*** 
(1.54) 
6.16*** 
(1.36) 
a. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠) 
b. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠) 
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table A5. 
 The DRD Effects of SB55 on Instructional Resource Allocation (comparison) 
 
𝑛𝑗 = 48, 𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 288 
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 57.27*** 
(1.24) 
36.82** 
(12.32) 
28.88* 
(12.41) 
39.02*** 
(10.76) 
121.17*** 
(18.69) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 2.18* 
(0.93) 
2.16* 
(0.93) 
2.54** 
(0.94) 
2.80** 
(0.96) 
2.85** 
(0.93) 
SB55 
 -4.77** 
(1.51) 
-7.60*** 
(2.26) 
-6.95** 
(2.28) 
-3.61~ 
(2.10) 
-2.61 
(1.96) 
Year 
 0.20 
(0.15) 
0.20 
(0.15) 
0.21 
(0.15) 
0.62** 
(0.24) 
0.73** 
(0.23) 
After Policy 
 -0.50 
(0.38) 
-0.50 
(0.37) 
-0.42 
(0.38) 
-0.74~ 
(0.40) 
-0.38 
(0.40) 
SB55*Year 
 -1.49*** 
(0.37) 
-1.48*** 
(0.37) 
-1.51***  
(0.37) 
-1.61*** 
(0.40) 
-1.71*** 
(0.39) 
After Policy*Year 
 -0.36~ 
(0.21) 
-0.35 
(0.21) 
-0.31 
(0.21) 
-0.65* 
(0.27) 
-0.17 
(0.27) 
SB55*Year*After 
 1.37** 
(0.52) 
1.41** 
(0.52) 
1.31* 
(0.52) 
1.40* 
(0.55) 
1.56** 
(0.53) 
Total Studentsa 
 
 
1.96~ 
(1.18) 
1.58 
(1.17) 
0.77 
(0.98) 
8.98*** 
(1.91) 
%Primary 
 
  
13.67~ 
(7.28) 
8.51 
(10.67) 
12.47 
(10.35) 
%Middle 
 
  
8.69 
(14.34) 
4.79 
(16.22) 
2.55 
(15.65) 
%Secondary 
 
  
14.30~ 
(8.40) 
0.90 
(11.80) 
9.34 
(11.43) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
-8.82* 
(4.40) 
-5.74 
(4.29) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
1.44 
(1.32) 
1.02 
(1.27) 
%Black 
 
   
1.46 
(8.18) 
3.02 
(7.87) 
%Latino 
 
   
23.74~ 
(12.94) 
26.11* 
(12.20) 
%Asian 
 
   
-4.89 
(21.97) 
15.35 
(22.21) 
%Native 
 
   
73.51 
(180.63) 
50.71 
(172.64) 
%White 
 
   
10.18 
(8.10) 
8.25 
(7.81) 
Total Expendituresb 
 
    
-9.11*** 
(1.87) 
Property Tax PPRc 
 
    
0.47 
(0.88) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
2.06*** 
(0.19) 
1.84*** 
(0.17) 
1.83*** 
(0.17) 
1.78*** 
(0.16) 
1.78*** 
(0.16) 
1.67*** 
(0.15) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
11.50*** 
(2.42) 
10.84*** 
(2.28) 
10.58*** 
(2.23) 
10.13*** 
(2.13) 
6.28*** 
(1.38) 
5.26*** 
(1.15) 
a. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠) 
b. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠) 
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table A6.  
The DID Effects of HB282 on Instructional Resource Allocation 
 
 
𝑛𝑗 = 222, 𝑛𝑖𝑗
= 444 
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 58.07*** 
(0.83) 
59.15*** 
(3.13) 
59.28*** 
(4.34) 
55.44*** 
(4.60) 
98.29*** 
(12.09) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 0.30 
(0.38) 
0.30 
(0.38) 
0.30 
(0.38) 
0.31 
(0.38) 
0.42 
(0.38) 
HB282 
 -2.54** 
(0.85) 
-2.41* 
(0.94) 
-2.59** 
(0.96) 
-2.27* 
(0.98) 
-1.72~ 
(0.95) 
After Policy 
 -0.59*** 
(0.09) 
-0.59*** 
(0.09) 
-0.58*** 
(0.09) 
-0.58*** 
(0.09) 
-0.27* 
(0.12) 
Total Studentsa 
 
 
-0.12 
(0.33) 
-0.14 
(0.34) 
0.39 
(0.35) 
4.86** 
(1.45) 
%Primary 
 
  
2.77 
(5.04) 
11.07 
(7.39) 
10.16 
(7.25) 
%Middle 
 
  
-2.19 
(7.89) 
9.01 
(9.58) 
14.22 
(9.52) 
%Secondary 
 
  
-2.73 
(5.35) 
5.46 
(7.75) 
10.18 
(7.67) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
2.80 
(5.92) 
7.95 
(5.90) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
0.69 
(2.01) 
-1.47 
(2.16) 
%Black 
 
   
-14.00* 
(6.40) 
-11.96~ 
(6.33) 
%Latino 
 
   
6.99 
(8.88) 
6.39 
(8.63) 
%Asian 
 
   
-44.06** 
(15.76) 
-8.71 
(17.07) 
%Native 
 
   
-142.01 
(113.98) 
-141.25 
(112.49) 
%White 
 
   
-8.61 
(6.26) 
-9.16 
(6.18) 
Total Expendituresb 
 
    
-4.46** 
(1.47) 
Property Tax PPRc 
 
    
-0.69 
(0.55) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
1.05*** 
(0.10) 
0.89*** 
(0.08) 
0.89*** 
(0.08) 
0.88*** 
(0.08) 
0.88*** 
(0.08) 
0.87*** 
(0.08) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
8.29*** 
(0.84) 
8.06*** 
(0.81) 
8.05*** 
(0.81) 
8.08*** 
(0.81) 
6.92*** 
(0.71) 
6.33*** 
(0.66) 
a. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠) 
b. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠) 
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table A7.  
The RD Effects of HB282 on Instructional Resource Allocation 
 
𝑛𝑗 = 13, 𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 130 
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 57.92*** 
(0.83) 
53.50** 
(14.43) 
31.71~ 
(16.82) 
48.14** 
(14.92) 
105.09** 
(31.64) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 -0.07 
(0.17) 
-0.06 
(0.17) 
-0.16 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.30) 
-0.04 
(0.28) 
Year 
 -0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.12 
(0.12) 
-0.04 
(0.13) 
-0.05 
(0.24) 
0.19 
(0.26) 
After Policy 
 -0.30 
(0.50) 
-0.29 
(0.50) 
-0.46 
(0.50) 
-0.56 
(0.57) 
-0.43 
(0.56) 
Total Studentsa 
 
 
0.49 
(1.59) 
1.24 
(1.58) 
-0.15 
(1.36) 
-0.37 
(2.64) 
%Primary 
 
  
18.20~ 
(10.13) 
-4.19 
(14.96) 
-4.21 
(14.32) 
%Middle 
 
  
14.68 
(17.44) 
9.15 
(18.56) 
14.00 
(17.82) 
%Secondary 
 
  
11.12 
(12.12) 
-3.44 
(15.24) 
0.77 
(14.65) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
-0.26 
(6.18) 
-1.63 
(5.92) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
-2.27 
(3.40) 
-4.85 
(3.33) 
%Black 
 
   
10.35 
(8.17) 
11.11 
(7.79) 
%Latino 
 
   
42.54 
(10.06) 
44.02*** 
(9.52) 
%Asian 
 
   
-201.26* 
(90.03) 
-53.38 
(94.45) 
%Native 
 
   
-27.84 
(235.65) 
21.22 
(224.83) 
%White 
 
   
15.56~ 
(8.40) 
15.93 
(8.07) 
Total Expendituresb 
 
    
-1.84 
(2.81) 
Property Tax PPRc 
 
    
-3.04** 
(1.00) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
2.26*** 
(0.30) 
1.89*** 
(0.25) 
1.89*** 
(0.25) 
1.84*** 
(0.24) 
1.80*** 
(0.24) 
1.65*** 
(0.23) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
7.83** 
(3.16) 
7.87** 
(3.16) 
7.63** 
(3.14) 
6.85** 
(2.85) 
1.09* 
(0.64) 
0.87~ 
(0.55) 
a. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠) 
b. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠) 
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table A8.  
The DRD Effects of HB282 on Instructional Resource Allocation  
 
𝑛𝑗 = 222, 𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 2220 
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 57.92*** 
(0.80) 
62.95*** 
(2.58) 
60.73*** 
(3.26) 
57.75*** 
(3.37) 
113.49*** 
(6.22) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 0.69 
(0.56) 
0.69 
(0.56) 
0.69 
(0.56) 
0.66 
(0.56) 
0.78 
(0.55) 
HB282 
 -2.97*** 
(0.88) 
-2.34* 
(0.93) 
-2.16* 
(0.93) 
-1.49 
(0.94) 
-0.59 
(0.92) 
Year 
 0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.16** 
(0.05) 
0.40*** 
(0.06) 
After Policy 
 -0.99*** 
(0.14) 
-0.99*** 
(0.14) 
-0.99*** 
(0.14) 
1.09*** 
(0.15) 
-0.76*** 
(0.15) 
HB282*Year 
 -0.21 
(0.14) 
-0.22 
(0.14) 
-0.19 
(0.14) 
-0.18 
(0.14) 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
After Policy*Year 
 -0.16*** 
(0.05) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.24*** 
(0.06) 
-0.17** 
(0.06) 
HB282*Year*After 
 0.10 
(0.19) 
0.10 
(0.19) 
0.06 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.19) 
0.08 
(0.19) 
Total Studentsa 
 
 
-0.56* 
(0.27) 
-0.53~ 
(0.27) 
-0.15 
(0.28) 
6.20*** 
(0.67) 
%Primary 
 
  
2.40 
(2.21) 
2.39 
(2.93) 
2.76 
(2.86) 
%Middle 
 
  
-6.08~ 
(3.44) 
-5.67 
(3.86) 
-3.64 
(3.78) 
%Secondary 
 
  
8.22** 
(2.90) 
7.79* 
(3.48) 
8.44* 
(3.41) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
-2.53 
(1.62) 
-0.77 
(1.59) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
1.27 
(0.87) 
1.14 
(0.87) 
%Black 
 
   
-4.57* 
(2.28) 
-2.49 
(2.24) 
%Latino 
 
   
15.82** 
(5.22) 
14.75** 
(5.11) 
%Asian 
 
   
-13.72 
(8.60) 
-4.24 
(8.62) 
%Native 
 
   
13.72 
(44.83) 
23.47 
(43.73) 
%White 
 
   
1.11 
(2.03) 
1.49 
(1.98) 
Total Expendituresb 
 
    
-6.72*** 
(0.65) 
Property Tax PPRc 
 
    
0.74* 
(0.30) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
2.53*** 
(0.08) 
2.30*** 
(0.07) 
2.29*** 
(0.07) 
2.27*** 
(0.07) 
2.26*** 
(0.07) 
2.15*** 
(0.07) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
7.15*** 
(0.70) 
6.85*** 
(0.67) 
6.92*** 
(0.68) 
6.90*** 
(0.68) 
5.89*** 
(0.59) 
5.65*** 
(0.58) 
a. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠) 
b. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠) 
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue), *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 12. The DID Effects of HB282 on Instructional Resource Allocation (comparison) 
 
𝑛𝑗 = 40, 𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 80 
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Finances 
 Intercept: 
 58.07*** 
(0.98) 
38.22* 
(16.17) 
31.34~ 
(16.48) 
60.09** 
(18.78) 
251.54*** 
(37.48) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 0.17 
(0.52) 
0.20 
(0.52) 
0.20 
(0.54) 
0.20 
(0.54) 
0.40 
(0.43) 
HB282 
 -2.23~ 
(0.85) 
-2.62* 
(1.22) 
-3.53* 
(1.33) 
-1.84 
(1.78) 
-0.75 
(1.63) 
After Policy 
 -0.45 
(0.30) 
-0.44 
(0.30) 
-0.27 
(0.32) 
-0.46 
(0.32) 
1.02** 
(0.36) 
Total Studentsa 
 
 
2.19 
(1.78) 
1.82 
(1.71) 
-0.97 
(1.85) 
18.32*** 
(3.72) 
%Primary 
 
  
29.56~ 
(15.02) 
78.04* 
(29.55) 
43.77 
(28.53) 
%Middle 
 
  
-23.08 
(36.39) 
86.10~ 
(47.40) 
59.21 
(40.58) 
%Secondary 
 
  
5.60 
(17.06) 
56.70 
(35.13) 
45.45 
(31.58) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
6.73 
(18.11) 
19.53 
(15.48) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
3.73 
(5.83) 
-1.67 
(5.70) 
%Black 
 
   
-74.86* 
(30.00) 
-34.36 
(28.37) 
%Latino 
 
   
-34.30 
(31.77) 
7.97 
(30.15) 
%Asian 
 
   
-78.15~ 
(39.42) 
8.21 
(40.47) 
%Native 
 
   
-555.77 
(409.02) 
-669.76~ 
(367.34) 
%White 
 
   
-64.58* 
(30.14) 
-35.50 
(27.97) 
Total Expendituresb 
 
    
-21.34*** 
(3.79) 
Property Tax PPRc 
 
    
1.32 
(1.42) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
1.27*** 
(0.28) 
1.18*** 
(0.26) 
1.18*** 
(0.26) 
1.22*** 
(0.28) 
1.17*** 
(0.27) 
0.69*** 
(0.17) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
12.22*** 
(2.88) 
11.25*** 
(2.65) 
10.89*** 
(2.57) 
9.51*** 
(2.34) 
5.30*** 
(1.36) 
4.76*** 
(1.26) 
a. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠) 
b. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠) 
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examining charter school policy and public school district resource a llocation in Ohio 27 
    
 
 
Table A9.  
The DRD Effects of HB282 on Instructional Resource Allocation  
 
𝑛𝑗 = 40, 𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 400 
Null 
Model 
Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept 
 57.92*** 
(0.88) 
45.88*** 
(9.39) 
34.13** 
(10.58) 
33.61** 
(10.57) 
113.82*** 
(18.35) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 0.53 
(0.60) 
0.54 
(0.60) 
0.40 
(0.60) 
0.27 
(0.60) 
0.39 
(0.60) 
HB282 
 -2.52* 
(1.12) 
-2.74* 
(1.11) 
-2.51* 
(1.14) 
-2.90* 
(1.20) 
-2.31* 
(1.08) 
Year 
 0.07 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
0.38** 
(0.14) 
After Policy 
 -0.83* 
(0.34) 
-0.81* 
(0.34) 
-0.76* 
(0.34) 
0.77* 
(0.37) 
-0.46 
(0.37) 
HB282*Year 
 -0.19 
(0.15) 
-0.18 
(0.15) 
-0.12 
(0.15) 
-0.12 
(0.15) 
-0.09 
(0.15) 
After Policy*Year 
 -0.18 
(0.12) 
-0.18 
(0.12) 
-0.21~ 
(0.12) 
-0.19 
(0.15) 
-0.19 
(0.15) 
HB282*Year*After 
 0.12 
(0.21) 
0.13 
(0.21) 
0.06 
(0.21) 
0.02 
(0.22) 
0.06 
(0.22) 
Total Studentsa 
 
 
1.33 
(1.03) 
1.57 
(1.03) 
1.48 
(1.01) 
6.02*** 
(1.54) 
%Primary 
 
  
10.96~ 
(5.85) 
1.53 
(8.04) 
2.72 
(7.85) 
%Middle 
 
  
3.30 
(8.50) 
-2.59 
(10.05) 
-2.27 
(9.85) 
%Secondary 
 
  
13.41~ 
(7.35) 
6.78 
(9.47) 
11.63 
(9.29) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
-0.83 
(3.87) 
-0.74 
(3.80) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
4.45* 
(2.18) 
2.92 
(2.10) 
%Black 
 
   
3.83 
(5.70) 
4.12 
(5.53) 
%Latino 
 
   
26.64** 
(9.51) 
30.05*** 
(8.07) 
%Asian 
 
   
-4.89 
(15.64) 
14.02 
(14.98) 
%Native 
 
   
78.57 
(123.41) 
81.91 
(120.82) 
%White 
 
   
8.61 
(5.45) 
7.90 
(5.33) 
Total Expendituresb 
 
    
-6.40*** 
(1.54) 
Property Tax PPRc 
 
    
-0.90 
(0.71) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
2.13*** 
(0.16) 
1.86*** 
(0.14) 
1.86*** 
(0.14) 
1.84*** 
(0.14) 
1.83*** 
(0.14) 
1.78*** 
(0.13) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
9.93*** 
(2.27) 
9.05*** 
(2.07) 
8.56*** 
(1.97) 
8.26*** 
(1.93) 
5.50*** 
(1.39) 
3.72*** 
(0.94) 
a. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠) 
b. log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠) 
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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